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><channel><title>Capital Flow Watch &#187; Financial Market Regulator</title> <atom:link href="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/category/market-oversight-and-regulation/financial-market-regulator/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><link>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net</link> <description>Conservative economic commentary from the top-down</description> <lastBuildDate>Sun, 05 Sep 2010 18:35:11 +0000</lastBuildDate> <generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.1</generator> <language>en</language> <sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod> <sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency> <item><title>Dodd-Frank won&#8217;t make better markets - Phony financial reform</title><link>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2010/07/17/why-dodd-frank-wont-bring-prosperity/</link> <comments>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2010/07/17/why-dodd-frank-wont-bring-prosperity/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Sat, 17 Jul 2010 14:02:42 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>John Schroy</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[Financial Market Regulator]]></category> <category><![CDATA[featured]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Barack Obama]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Barney Frank]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Chris Dodd]]></category> <category><![CDATA[complexity]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Corporate Governance]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Derivative Strategy]]></category> <category><![CDATA[dividends]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Economic Recovery]]></category> <category><![CDATA[efficient market hypothesis]]></category> <category><![CDATA[eurosystem]]></category> <category><![CDATA[executive stock options]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Great Depression]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Jeff Skilling]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Nobel prize in economics]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Pecora Commission]]></category> <category><![CDATA[pension plans]]></category> <category><![CDATA[rating agencies]]></category> <category><![CDATA[risk]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Stock Buybacks]]></category> <category><![CDATA[sub-prime mortgages]]></category> <category><![CDATA[US Congress]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/?p=4747</guid> <description><![CDATA[<a href="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2010/07/17/why-dodd-frank-wont-bring-prosperity/"><img align="left" hspace="5" width="150" height="150" src="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/rods-and-cones-150x150.jpg" class="alignleft tfe wp-post-image" alt="Financial markets can be extremely complex, with many areas that can fail and break." title="rods and cones" /></a>Unfortunately, instead of a 'game-changing' confidence-inspiring reform, the Obama administration presented the United States with the Dodd-Frank Act — a legislative miscarriage that has the potential to hold back recovery and impair the position of New York as a world financial center for decades — unless repealed or drastically amended.<div style="float: right; color: gray; font-size: 80%;"><p> <a href="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2010/07/17/why-dodd-frank-wont-bring-prosperity/">More &#187; <strong>Dodd-Frank won&#8217;t make better markets</strong></a></p></div>]]></description> <wfw:commentRss>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2010/07/17/why-dodd-frank-wont-bring-prosperity/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>0</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>Banks accept California IOUs for deposit - State finance:</title><link>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/07/06/banks-accept-california-ious-for-deposit/</link> <comments>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/07/06/banks-accept-california-ious-for-deposit/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2009 14:26:06 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>John Schroy</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[Financial Market Regulator]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Bank of America]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Barbara Boxer]]></category> <category><![CDATA[California]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Chase Manhattan]]></category> <category><![CDATA[FDIC]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Henry Waxman]]></category> <category><![CDATA[legal tender]]></category> <category><![CDATA[money]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Nancy Pelosi]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Wells Fargo]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">http://capital-flow-analysis.com/capital-flow-watch/banks-accept-california-ious-for-deposit.html</guid> <description><![CDATA[<a href="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/07/06/banks-accept-california-ious-for-deposit/"><img align="left" hspace="5" width="150" src="http://capital-flow-watch.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/Emperor-Norton.jpg" class="alignleft wp-post-image tfe" alt="Emperor Norton, typical California nut-case" title="Emperor Norton" /></a>On July 2, 2009, the Federal Reserve announced that it was aware that the State of California was issuing its own currency to pay its bills.This, of course, is consistent with the lack of fiscal discipline which is the hall mark of far left Californian politicians, of which Nancy Pelosi is a prime example.California has experience with nut-case economics, having been the home of the famous Emperor Norton who issued his own currency to pay his bills in the mid-19th century.<div style="float: right; color: gray; font-size: 80%;"><p> <a href="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/07/06/banks-accept-california-ious-for-deposit/">More &#187; <strong>Banks accept California IOUs for deposit</strong></a></p></div>]]></description> <wfw:commentRss>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/07/06/banks-accept-california-ious-for-deposit/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>1</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>Bank stress tests: aftermath and consequences - Good and bad banks</title><link>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/05/08/bank-stress-tests-the-aftermath-and-consequences/</link> <comments>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/05/08/bank-stress-tests-the-aftermath-and-consequences/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Fri, 08 May 2009 22:42:08 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>John Schroy</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[Financial Market Regulator]]></category> <category><![CDATA[ACORN]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Banco Brasileiro de Descontos]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Bank Indonesia]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Bank of America]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Barack Obama]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Barney Frank]]></category> <category><![CDATA[BB&T]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Ben Bernanke]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Capital One]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Chris Dodd]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Chrysler]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Citicorp]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Federal Reserve Bank]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Fifth Third]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Henry Paulson]]></category> <category><![CDATA[JP Morgan Chase]]></category> <category><![CDATA[KeyCorp]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Mercantilist Ideology]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Merrill Lynch]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Regions Financial]]></category> <category><![CDATA[reserve currency]]></category> <category><![CDATA[SunTrust]]></category> <category><![CDATA[TARP]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Timothy Geithner]]></category> <category><![CDATA[United Auto Workers]]></category> <category><![CDATA[US Bancorp]]></category> <category><![CDATA[US dollar]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Wells Fargo]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">http://capital-flow-analysis.com/capital-flow-watch/bank-stress-tests-the-aftermath-and-consequences.html</guid> <description><![CDATA[<a href="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/05/08/bank-stress-tests-the-aftermath-and-consequences/"><img align="left" hspace="5" width="150" src="http://capital-flow-watch.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/tar.jpg" class="alignleft wp-post-image tfe" alt="tarred and feathered" title="tar" /></a>In May 2009, the Obama administration divided some of America's largest banks into 'good banks' and 'bad banks'.This broke a long-standing practice of protecting the reputation of the US banking system.  The Obama government seized TARP funds as an instrument of political power.Banks, large and small, are now eager to escape the trap of taking TARP funds, which will require them to raise $74.6 billion, either by selling equities on the market, or from profits.<div style="float: right; color: gray; font-size: 80%;"><p> <a href="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/05/08/bank-stress-tests-the-aftermath-and-consequences/">More &#187; <strong>Bank stress tests: aftermath and consequences</strong></a></p></div>]]></description> <wfw:commentRss>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/05/08/bank-stress-tests-the-aftermath-and-consequences/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>0</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>Is big bank complexity irreversible? - The McKinsey Heresy</title><link>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/04/06/is-big-bank-complexity-irreversible-the-mckinsey-heresy/</link> <comments>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/04/06/is-big-bank-complexity-irreversible-the-mckinsey-heresy/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2009 17:55:58 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>John Schroy</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[Financial Market Regulator]]></category> <category><![CDATA[featured]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Alfred P. Sloan]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Bank of America]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Charles Wilson]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Chase Manhattan]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Citibank]]></category> <category><![CDATA[complexity]]></category> <category><![CDATA[General Motors]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Glass-Steagall Act]]></category> <category><![CDATA[matrix organization]]></category> <category><![CDATA[McKinsey]]></category> <category><![CDATA[nationalization]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Peter Drucker]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Sandy Weill]]></category> <category><![CDATA[systemic risk]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Walter Wriston]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">http://capital-flow-analysis.com/capital-flow-watch/is-big-bank-complexity-irreversible-the-mckinsey-heresy.html</guid> <description><![CDATA[<a href="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/04/06/is-big-bank-complexity-irreversible-the-mckinsey-heresy/"><img align="left" hspace="5" width="150" height="150" src="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/normal_GM_Building-150x150.jpg" class="alignleft tfe wp-post-image" alt="In 1956, General Motors had profits of $1.1 billion" title="normal_GM_Building" /></a>The root problem with big banks today is organizational and product line complexity.  Excessive complexity in banks can be traced to the reorganization of Citibank in 1956, under Walter Wriston, following the advice of McKinsey and Company.Under the McKinsey structure, banks were transformed into industrial-type marketing institutions with matrix organization by product line.  Bank managers were paid to meet budgetary targets, rather than for being prudent bankers.<div style="float: right; color: gray; font-size: 80%;"><p> <a href="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/04/06/is-big-bank-complexity-irreversible-the-mckinsey-heresy/">More &#187; <strong>Is big bank complexity irreversible?</strong></a></p></div>]]></description> <wfw:commentRss>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/04/06/is-big-bank-complexity-irreversible-the-mckinsey-heresy/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>2</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>Some banks are too complex to manage - The decline of Citicorp</title><link>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/04/05/some-banks-have-become-too-complex-to-manage/</link> <comments>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/04/05/some-banks-have-become-too-complex-to-manage/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Sun, 05 Apr 2009 17:54:08 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>John Schroy</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[Financial Market Regulator]]></category> <category><![CDATA[featured]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Bank of England]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Citibank]]></category> <category><![CDATA[complexity]]></category> <category><![CDATA[FDIC]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Federal Reserve Bank]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Mervyn King]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Sheila Bair]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">http://capital-flow-analysis.com/capital-flow-watch/some-banks-have-become-too-complex-to-manage.html</guid> <description><![CDATA[<a href="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/04/05/some-banks-have-become-too-complex-to-manage/"><img align="left" hspace="5" width="150" height="150" src="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/KISS-150x150.jpg" class="alignleft tfe wp-post-image" alt="KISS: Keep it simple, Stupid!" title="KISS" /></a>It is no secret that Citicorp no longer earns the same respect in financial circles as in days of yore.  The problem is excessive complexity.  This article describes the simplicity of the Citibank operation in 1956 when the bank was the world's most powerful financial institution.It will not be easy, maybe not possible, for Citicorp to simplify operations and relearn the principles of sound banking.<div style="float: right; color: gray; font-size: 80%;"><p> <a href="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/04/05/some-banks-have-become-too-complex-to-manage/">More &#187; <strong>Some banks are too complex to manage</strong></a></p></div>]]></description> <wfw:commentRss>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/04/05/some-banks-have-become-too-complex-to-manage/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>1</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>Mark-to-market nonsense - The &#039;insolvent bank&#039; oxymoron</title><link>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/04/01/the-solvent-bank-oxymoron-and-mark-to-market-rules/</link> <comments>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/04/01/the-solvent-bank-oxymoron-and-mark-to-market-rules/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2009 18:59:30 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>John Schroy</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[Financial Market Regulator]]></category> <category><![CDATA[featured]]></category> <category><![CDATA[complexity]]></category> <category><![CDATA[efficient market hypothesis]]></category> <category><![CDATA[FDIC]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Glass-Steagall Act]]></category> <category><![CDATA[insolvency]]></category> <category><![CDATA[liquidity]]></category> <category><![CDATA[mark-to-market]]></category> <category><![CDATA[New Deal]]></category> <category><![CDATA[stress tests]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Timothy Geithner]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Walter Wriston]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">http://capital-flow-analysis.com/capital-flow-watch/the-solvent-bank-oxymoron-and-mark-to-market-rules.html</guid> <description><![CDATA[<a href="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/04/01/the-solvent-bank-oxymoron-and-mark-to-market-rules/"><img align="left" hspace="5" width="150" height="150" src="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/bank_run-150x150.jpg" class="alignleft tfe wp-post-image" alt="Run on Northern Rock Bank, Birmingham, UK, in 2007" title="bank_run" /></a>Banks, by their nature, are insolvent, requiring government guarantees of their liabilities to protect against bank runs.  Over the last fifty years, the percentage of bank liabilities guaranteed by the government has fallen considerably, while banks, free from the shackles of the Glass-Steagall Act, have become increasingly complex.Mark-to-market rules do not provide useful information to either bank depositors or investors, but may increase bank capital requirements, reducing the capacity to lend in the midst of a recession.<div style="float: right; color: gray; font-size: 80%;"><p> <a href="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/04/01/the-solvent-bank-oxymoron-and-mark-to-market-rules/">More &#187; <strong>Mark-to-market nonsense</strong></a></p></div>]]></description> <wfw:commentRss>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2009/04/01/the-solvent-bank-oxymoron-and-mark-to-market-rules/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>0</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>Will your assets survive an atomic blast? - Questionable SIPC Guarantees?</title><link>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2006/07/24/sipc-guarantees-will-your-assets-survive-an-atomic-blast/</link> <comments>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2006/07/24/sipc-guarantees-will-your-assets-survive-an-atomic-blast/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Mon, 24 Jul 2006 15:50:00 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>John Schroy</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[Financial Market Regulator]]></category> <category><![CDATA[business continuity plans]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Comptroller of the Currency]]></category> <category><![CDATA[FDIC]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Federal Reserve Bank]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Lehman Brothers]]></category> <category><![CDATA[NASD]]></category> <category><![CDATA[New York City]]></category> <category><![CDATA[New York Times]]></category> <category><![CDATA[NYSE]]></category> <category><![CDATA[SIPC]]></category> <category><![CDATA[US SEC]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">http://capital-flow-analysis.com/capital-flow-watch/sipc-guarantees-will-your-assets-survive-an-atomic-blast.html</guid> <description><![CDATA[<a href="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2006/07/24/sipc-guarantees-will-your-assets-survive-an-atomic-blast/"><img align="left" hspace="5" width="150" height="86" src="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/wp-content/uploads/2006/07/sipc.gif" class="alignleft tfe wp-post-image" alt="Will this protect you?" title="sipc" /></a>Millions have brokerage accounts with SIPC protection and think this means they have government insurance of up to $500,000 on securities in custody with a broker-dealer, plus $100,000 on cash balances — similar to the FDIC guarantee on bank accounts.In this, millions of investors are mistaken.<div style="float: right; color: gray; font-size: 80%;"><p> <a href="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2006/07/24/sipc-guarantees-will-your-assets-survive-an-atomic-blast/">More &#187; <strong>Will your assets survive an atomic blast?</strong></a></p></div>]]></description> <wfw:commentRss>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2006/07/24/sipc-guarantees-will-your-assets-survive-an-atomic-blast/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>1</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>Pension fund accounting rules tightened - FASB</title><link>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2006/04/01/pension-fund-accounting-rules-tightened-%e2%80%a6-again/</link> <comments>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2006/04/01/pension-fund-accounting-rules-tightened-%e2%80%a6-again/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Sat, 01 Apr 2006 10:08:20 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>John Schroy</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[Financial Market Regulator]]></category> <category><![CDATA[FASB]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Full Disclosure]]></category> <category><![CDATA[pension plans]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Stock Buybacks]]></category> <category><![CDATA[trade unions]]></category> <category><![CDATA[US taxation]]></category><guid isPermaLink="false">http://capital-flow-analysis.info/capital-flow-watch/archives/120</guid> <description><![CDATA[<a href="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2006/04/01/pension-fund-accounting-rules-tightened-%e2%80%a6-again/"><img align="left" hspace="5" width="150" height="150" src="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/wp-content/uploads/2006/04/elderly-woman-150x150.jpg" class="alignleft tfe wp-post-image" alt="Accounting rules effect real people" title="elderly woman" /></a>FASB concept statement No. 5 represents a further slow tightening of the screws as to the way pension liabilities are reported — one step in a long, excruciating journey that has been underway for decades. This rule is expected to have an incremental negative impact on old, unionized companies, further decline in private defined-benefit plans, and higher state and local taxes.<div style="float: right; color: gray; font-size: 80%;"><p> <a href="http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2006/04/01/pension-fund-accounting-rules-tightened-%e2%80%a6-again/">More &#187; <strong>Pension fund accounting rules tightened</strong></a></p></div>]]></description> <wfw:commentRss>http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2006/04/01/pension-fund-accounting-rules-tightened-%e2%80%a6-again/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>0</slash:comments> </item> </channel> </rss>